

The Creation and Social Transmission of Psychoanalytic Knowledge

By Arnold D. Richards

It is a great honor to have been asked to give this address. I thank the program committee for the invitation, and thanks to Dick Simons too for his warm and generous remarks, which bear on what I'm going to talk about this afternoon. Dick and I go back a long way. In the early sixties, as he told you, we overlapped as residents at the Menninger School of Psychiatry. Menninger's was unique in the American at that time, and a residency there was an intoxicating experience. Karl's bio-psycho-social model of psychiatry, his commitment to psychoanalysis, and his support of an outstanding group of thinkers made Topeka an integrated community of researchers, scholars, and clinicians of all kinds. No distinction was made there between medical and non-medical psychoanalysts. Psychologists held their own among the outstanding training analysts at the Topeka Psychoanalytic Institute, and the analytic community itself was integrated with the surrounding academic world as embodied by the luminaries known as the Alfred P. Sloane professors.

Menninger's was a place where psychiatry and psychoanalysis were both part of a larger academic, scientific, philosophical, and cultural community, and its fertility can be seen in the astonishing body of published papers that came out of Topeka at that time.

My long concern with the place of psychoanalysis in the intellectual world is very much the fruit of my time at MSP. I started thinking about it when I came back to New York to start my analytic training, and the broad Topeka focus had to give way to a narrower one. I was lucky, because the faculty of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute at that time included many of the great European and American analysts of the twentieth century:

But still, something was missing. The heavily medical enclave that was the NYPI felt very different from the multidisciplinary collegiality in Topeka. The most visible difference was the lesser presence of colleagues from other disciplines. APsaA rules explicitly restricted the clinical practice of psychoanalysis for its psychologist "research candidates," who had to pledge not to represent themselves as classical psychoanalysts or engage in the private practice of psychoanalysis.

Karl Menninger had had enough clout in the APsaA to get around this rule, but what he did for his institute was not tolerated anywhere else. The more usual APsaA agenda of maintaining the medical identity of psychoanalysis meant that psychologists, researchers, and other academics were low on the totem pole were very unequal partners. It also meant that an easy back and forth between psychoanalytic research, clinical practice, and analytic scholarship was much harder to find.

When I got to New York I saw for the first time how isolating this agenda of exclusion was. It alienated some of the most creative thinkers in New York psychology from Association institutes and discourse. When Robert Holt and George Klein established the NYU Research Center for Mental Health, for example, the established APsaA institutes in New York paid little attention was to their work. Yet the Research Center was contributing to psychoanalytic theory and research greatly out of proportion to its size and centrality.

It is the connection between exclusion and isolation that I want to address today.

Psychoanalysis is losing ground. After years of controversies and years of attempts at resolution, areas of contention within it and about it are getting wider. Dissension is a problem now not only between our Association and other psychoanalytic organizations, but within APsaA itself, and some chasms appear to be getting deeper. The new venues for discussion have not done enough, and the lawsuit that ended medical exclusivity has not brought us out of the wilderness and into the promised land. Psychoanalysis is no longer the undisputed queen of the psychotherapies. The welcome and respect that it used to find in the larger intellectual world can no longer be taken for granted, even -- in the final irony of all, perhaps especially -- in the world of medicine and psychiatry.

In his Presidential Address at the 2000 Fall Meeting, Robert Pyles warned that psychoanalysis was under siege and fighting for its survival. PP Although I don't entirely agree with his sense of why this is so, I agree with the diagnosis and with his approach to the challenge: "We must become not quite citizen scholars," he said, "but analytic scholar-activists. Our splendid isolation must end."

In his call to arms Pyles encouraged us to anticipate a day five years thence when we would be able to "look back as a profession and see our member societies fully engaged in the major social and political issues of our time." But those five years are up next winter, and we seem farther than ever from the goal -- to say nothing of our other goals: engagement in the major intellectual issues of our time; responsive governance in our own organizations; a spirit of collaboration among ourselves and with our counterparts in related fields.

The psychoanalytic polis is not growing and is shrinking. Although some interest in psychoanalysis can still be found in the universities, our authority is decreasing as well. It is often said that we are undergoing a crisis in psychoanalytic identity, and I think that's true -- that it is identity issues that are keeping us from a healthier, more vital, and growth-enhancing connection among ourselves and with the intellectual surround.

Harvard biologist Richard Lewontin in a recent New York Review of Books article cited a favorite maxim of some of his lawyer friends. "The only general rule for deciding legal disputes," they assert, "is that it depends on the jurisdiction." That is, disputes get decided according to who is deciding them -- and where, and in what context. Lewontin went on to apply this rule to scientific questions of public import. He called it "disingenuous to claim that scientists come to their work without prior ethical, economic, and social values and motivations (2004, p. 39). Even on the most basic level questions of science are inseparable from questions of policy -- no one, for instance, is likely to call the malaria parasite? an endangered species? since not even the most ardent environmentalist cares about ensuring its survival. Lewontin's dry commentary highlights the connection between scientific substance and scientific practitioners, and the consequent importance of learning as much as we can about the sociological processes of science, including our own.

There is a lot yet to learn about this. Scientific knowledge -- at least in terms of the personal and social contexts that shape it -- has not been a subject of intense study until recently. But since the 1930s it has been clear that it is too simple to imagine that social factors corrupt science from without. Social factors -- factors of identity -- are integral to the production of knowledge in science -- even to the determination of what counts as science at all. "Science" is not something separate, distinct, but an open system that is as sensitive to context as it is to content. To study the sociology of knowledge is to take careful account of what we include in our daily thinking

and practice, and what we leave out.

Following Freud (1923), we are accustomed to thinking of psychoanalysis in a tripartite fashion: as a method of investigation, a form of therapy, and a theory of the human mind. We are much less used to thinking of it as an institution, a discipline, or a group of people engaged in a competitive struggle to survive in the social and intellectual marketplace. But it is all those things, and it is worth noting that scholars outside our own community -- that is, scholars who are not psychoanalysts -- have been much quicker to turn their efforts in this direction than we have. Some sources: PP

I will start with Ludwig Fleck , because his concern with discourse among and within scientific communities addresses the heart of our problem, as I see it

Fleck was a Polish Jewish immunologist and historian of science who published in 1935 a study called *The Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact*. He received little general attention until the sixties, when Kuhn credited him in his own 1962 landmark work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. But Fleck developed and elaborated ideas that proved germinal for the discipline that came to be known as the sociology of scientific knowledge. Among them was the observation that any scientific field organizes itself into PP thought collectives -- -- and PP thought styles.

Fleck defined a thought collective as "a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas for maintaining intellectual interaction," and said that it "provides the special carrier for the historical development of any field of thought as well as for the given stock of knowledge and level of culture" (p. 39). The shared attitudes or background assumptions that characterize a thought collective he called its thought style.

Fleck=s ideas seemed relevant to the differences in atmosphere between the psychoanalytic communities in Topeka and New York, for instance, and the questions I had been pondering about the way exclusionary practices seem to result in isolation. . How do thought collectives form?, he asks. What shapes the thought styles that characterize them? How do they work, how do they separate and conjoin? He raised too the related question of how scientific thought communities converse with each other -- that is, how scientific thought is transmitted. He defined four functional varieties of knowledge:

journal science (the shared theoretical science of a professional group), handbook science (practical procedures and the technical guides for carrying them out); textbook science, the established repositories of current knowledge that are used for teaching, and popular science, the aspects of the field that are part of the culture and zeitgeist. The area of most immediate interest to me, of course, was journal science, since I had just spent ten years trying to facilitate the transmission of knowledge among groups of colleagues that I was now seeing as different thought collectives. I was very aware that the standing of psychoanalysis in the community at large would be strengthened by more sensitivity to the need for a robust popular science as well. Serious battles were going on in the APSAA about what should be taught, by whom, and how this teaching should be conveyed and assessed -- textbook and handbook science. Fleck's non polemical view of the dynamics of scientific communities gave a welcome perspective on all this.

So did my pursuit on non-psychoanalytic studies of psychoanalysis. Although openness to self-scrutiny is a necessary part of our analytic discipline and character -- a preeminent tool of

psychological development -- we do not always try to look at ourselves from the outside and see how different academic disciplines - neighboring thought collectives - see us. And I noticed increasingly that these outside sources focused from their different perspectives on a single theme -- the personality of a field, its perspective, its discipline -- in short, the development of character that our analytic forbears called Bildung.

BILDUNG

Bildung was a concept much cherished by nineteenth-century Germans. The word itself means formation, and it refers specifically to what used to be called in less politically correct times the "making" of a man, the process of inner development that was held to produce a mature and cultured sensibility, intellect, and character. Bildung included education, but it was much more than that. It meant not only schooling but also experience, and the way experience was sought and used in the service of one's ideals. It gave its name to the beloved literary genre of the Bildungsroman, the novel that recounts the education, development, and maturation of a young protagonist. And it became to me the key to thinking about our psychoanalytic situation today.

Early psychoanalysis grew out of a very particular ideal of Bildung. So did the establishment of psychoanalysis in America a number of years later, and so, I hope to persuade you, does psychoanalysis now. But not the same ideal. In a paper called "Bildung, or the Formation of the Psychoanalyst," Taiwanese historian of science Wen-ji Wang cites a description from Richard Sterba's 1982 *Reminiscences of a Vienna Psychoanalyst* of the humanistic tradition in which the early members of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society were nurtured. "To be considered gebildet [well formed]," Sterba writes, "one had to be able to speak at least two living languages (predominantly English and French), besides German. . . . The knowledge of ancient Latin and Greek, the obligatory studies at the gymnasium, was taken for granted." A gebildeter Mensch also had to be on top of current events, conversant with the most important works of Western art and literature, and master of the vocabulary and manners of the cultured elite. This was an ideal, Sterba acknowledged, but most of the society, attained it to some extent and "a few of them, like Bernfeld PP

Hartmann, Kris, and Waelder, even attained an usual degree. And "Sigmund Freud was above all of us. His Bildung was of the highest level." The gebildeter cast of mind was absorbed during a childhood in the correct milieu, Sterba went on, and he cautioned that it was very difficult to acquire it later (Sterba 1982, pp. 80-81).

This preoccupation with Bildung sheds some welcome new light on our long debate over lay analysis. Unless he is well at home in such subjects as mythology, the history of civilization, the psychology of religion, and the science of literature, Freud insisted, "an analyst can make nothing of a large account of his material." His view that a medical education was not enough is well known, but it is less frequently acknowledged that the remainder of the course of study that he prescribed is no more characteristic of training for psychology or social work than it is for medicine.

But Freud wasn't talking about anything as pragmatic as training. He was talking about something much more fundamental -- about Sterba's ideal. His stipulations about analytic qualifications are less objective requirements of the profession he founded than reflections of his own subjective sense of what sort of personal foundation--Bildung--made for understanding, trustworthiness, and decency. Common ideas about Bildung were a force for unity in Freud's

society that crossed professional, religious, and class lines. Freud assumed that he and his patients shared the same ideal of the thinking and cultured individual, and the same steeping in the religious, mythologic, and literary psychology of their culture. He held himself to a strict ideal, and expected that his patients -- in the "material" they produced -- would hold him to the same one.

But any definition of what a psychoanalyst should be is going to reflect the ideals of Bildung that are prevalent in its time, and our immigrant society is a less homogeneous one than nineteenth-century intellectual Vienna. We no longer possess such a unifying ideal. Despite our decades of dispute, I doubt that many of us disagree in the abstract about what sort of person a good analyst should be -- honest, caring, well-meaning, intelligent, ethical, empathic, curious, and so on. But there is no longer any one specific educational marker that identifies gebildeter people in the way that nineteenth-century Viennese believed that the Gymnasium experience did -- as Sterba put it, "the obligatory studies at the gymnasium" were taken for granted. We look for degrees to identify good analysts, but although we seize upon in specific ones in different times and places, it's not degrees that matter. What we are really looking for in analysts is an ideal of Bildung -- and these ideals change.

I want to illustrate this with an extended example of how Bildung and its vicissitudes can prove decisive in intellectual developments. My subjects are Freud and his disciple A.A. Brill, who made perhaps the single most significant formative impact on the development of American psychoanalysis.

Underneath their disagreements these two men shared a profound commonalty. They were both secular Jewish intellectuals, both physicians, both intelligent and courageous. They were both indefatigable workers, committed to gaining institutional legitimacy for psychoanalysis in two very different cultures that granted Jews equality before the law, but not in society. And each ruled his own psychoanalytic domain with what Abraham Kardiner called "a jealous stranglehold."

They had roots in common as well.

Brill was born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire as Freud was, a little less than twenty years later. But not in Vienna or even Moravia, where Freud came from, but in Eastern Galicia -- a small shtetl of 900 Yiddish-speaking Jews called Konzuca, not far from Buchach, Brod, and Tzimentitz, the towns of origin of Freud's family. While Freud announced on at least one occasion that he was "born in Moravia, my parents came from Galicia," Brill never trumpeted his own birth in that part of the world. But Freud's parents did not stay there, and that is where some of the differences begin.

In his 1964 *Ordeal of Civility*, John Murray Cuddihy situates Freud's creation of psychoanalysis against the backdrop of the Jewish emancipation and what it meant for Jewish intellectuals. The concept of Bildung, he makes clear, had an expanded meaning for the many early analysts who were Jewish; it was their chance to win the conformity with cultured mores that would allow them to integrate into a heretofore excluding society. Yet each adoption of larger European cultural values was a step away from their family culture, and Brill and Freud dealt with that journey in very different ways that reflected their different starting points and family surrounds.

Cuddihy suggests that upwardly mobile urban Jews of the nineteenth century felt embarrassment towards their provincial parents, and "guilt for being thus ashamed." Freud was certainly

cognizant of this dynamic. Sara Winter points out that even before Freud made the trip he commemorated in "A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis," he was uncomfortably aware that he had, as he put it, "surpassed" his father, who could not read Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus in Greek as Freud, thanks to his classical education, was able to do.

Freud himself writes in the Acropolis paper:

"Our father had been in business. He had no secondary education and Athens could not have meant much to him. Thus what interfered with our enjoyment of the journey to Athens was a feeling of filial piety" (pp. 247B248, Standard Edition 22).

We have a less "pious" and more telling version of this theme from a Dr. M. Grinwald, a religious Jew from Buchoch, the birthplace of Freud's paternal grandfather Schlomo. In 1941 Grinwald contributed to Ha'aretz, the oldest Jewish periodical in Palestine, the story of an encounter with Freud in Vienna in the early years of the twentieth century. Grinwald gave a lecture on a controversial popular drama that many thought to be very derogatory of Orthodox Jews. After the talk, while he and his audience were having a friendly lunch, Freud made several jokes related to religion. Pointing out that many Jews resembled Yohanan the convert a the protagonist of the play with his shaggy coat, unkempt hair, and mysterious face, he commented that he himself preferred the man in the elegant tuxedo to the one dressed like a prophet. Grinwald recalled thinking to himself, "How far this man has drifted from Jewish life."

But in fact Freud had had little immediate experience of that version of "Jewish life." Long before Sigmund's Acropolis trip, his father was already by many measures a middle-class Viennese. Brill's father, on the other hand, exemplified the "man dressed like a prophet," and Brill had much farther to come in his departure from the pre-Emancipation Jewish ways.

Brill had a "father story" very similar to the famous "hat in the gutter" tale that Freud recounted in "The Interpretation of Dreams" -- and unlike Freud, he was there when it happened. Brill injured a finger as a small child, and his father took him to a doctor. When the boy became frightened, the irritated doctor took his anger out on Brill's father, who remained silent throughout. As Brill wrote later to Smith Ely Jelliffe,

"I never forgot this experience, the only impression left was that for once I saw my father being bullied, and accepting it, and by a physician. I must have resolved then and there that some day I should be one" (Hale, p. 390). Both sons thus resolved, with whatever feelings of ambivalence, to "surpass" their fathers, but they started from different points, and were brought up in very different circumstances and with very different ideals.

Freud's father moved to Vienna when Freud was five, and while he was hardly the success that his son became, he did well enough that Sigmund felt comfortable at the gymnasium he attended, and as an adult felt much more kinship with the cosmopolitan Viennese, "the man in the elegant tuxedo," than with the spiritual immigrant Yohanan of the play, the "convert" to a strange culture. Freud's father, whatever his weaknesses, did the emigrating for him. Brill, however, did it for himself.

His parents did not take advantage, as Freud's did, of the opportunities opening up for Jews as discriminatory laws were slowly reversed. Most biographies of Brill are either sketchy or unreliable, including his own, but according to historian and Brill scholar Paula Fass, Brill was brought up to pious observance in the old pre-Enlightenment Jewish tradition. Almost all that is

known of Brill's mother is that she wanted her son to be a rabbi, and his father wanted him to become a doctor. Brill later wrote to Smith Ely Jelliffe that he felt "literally stifled" by his parents; he left home to come alone to the United States at the age of fourteen. Unlike Freud, who according to Grinwald did not identify with prophets, Brill identified strongly with his namesake Abraham, who had been told by God to leave home and found a new country.

Brill and Freud both had conflicts with their fathers that were bound up with issues of Jewish identity, but they were different aspects of Jewish identity. Whereas Jakob Freud took the risk of emigrating to Vienna and establishing a life there, Brill's father clung to his Orthodox roots. Brill had a longer journey than Freud to achieve identification with a more cosmopolitan culture, since his father never took the first steps that Jakob Freud did. Freud was living comfortably in Vienna at the center of an established cultural tradition that he admired and felt part of. He was sufficiently sure of himself and his place that he could say of himself,

"I was born on 6th May 1856 in Freiberg in Moravia, a small town in what is today Czechoslovakia. My parents were Jews, and I too have remained a Jew."

But at the age when Freud was in his Viennese gymnasium, PP absorbing the mentality and mores of the upper classes, Brill was grappling with immigrant life on the Lower East Side -- struggling with English, eating strange food, scrabbling for money, looking for friends, and clawing his way to an education that would give him the kind of cultural capital that the gymnasium years had given Freud.

Winter supports Sterba's view that schooling was the main vehicle of acculturation in mid-nineteenth century Vienna, and that by that time a gymnasium education PP "had become a crucial element of upperclass and professional status in Germany and the German-speaking countries. And for those who did not come from economically and socially privileged backgrounds, the ideal of Bildung had the special benefit that it enabled them to claim their good taste as the basis for membership in a moral elite." Freud had a fine gymnasium education of which he was very proud; it entitled him to this status and benefit, and gave him membership, if limited membership, in the "moral elite" that dominated his society.

It is reasonable to suppose that Brill's educational experience was as much a part of his own formation as Freud's was of his, but it was a very different educational experience, and it resulted in a different formation. He probably received at least some secular schooling, but it is very unlikely that the nearest town (of 3000) could offer a school on a par with those in a major cultural capital. Brill's traditional Jewish education PP probably focused on the Hebrew prayer book and the traditional rules of cantillation; on the Bible and its commentaries; and on the Talmud. Yiddish was likely Brill's mother tongue; the language he studied was not Latin or Greek, but Hebrew. And unless he was very lucky, his teacher was probably a pious man of no particular intellectual achievement.

In short, Brill's education focused heavily on a narrow cultural-religious tradition. It was insular, uninformed by the ideal of looking beyond its own confines or considering itself in the context of other cultural traditions. Freud's education, whatever its own cultural limitations, offered a broader perspective. More to the point, it offered something that Brill missed out on completely - the Bildung that gave entree, even if only partial for Jews, to cultured urban society. Although he was very disappointed when he had to recognize that he would never, being a Jew, achieve the professorship he coveted at the university, Freud could live contentedly in Vienna, the base

from which he pursued his deep cultural interests, secure in his education and the sense of belonging it had imbued. Brill felt stifled by and estranged from his society, which was provincial and confining. Like Freud he was an ambitious man, and he did not intend to remain a provincial, or an outsider, for long. He had to get out.

When Brill arrived on these shores, he encountered a secular immigrant society drastically different from the narrow ethnic enclave he had left. That was both the good news and the bad news -- the trauma and the opportunity of emigration. He didn't know the language and he had no supportive community surround, but his lack of a gymnasium background was certainly not the disaster in New York that it would have been in Vienna or Berlin. In fact psychohistorian Frederick Wyatt cites the lament of a very different psychoanalytic immigrant -- the very highly gebildet Robert Waelder -- upon his arrival in Philadelphia: PP

"How can one teach here where one cannot use a single classical quotation?"

European-style cultural homogeneity was out of the question on the Lower East Side. Every new group of arrivals brought with it a different cargo of ideals and values. The one thing they all had in common was the need to make it, and it was the capacity to do that was most greatly envied and admired. That is, a new ideal of Bildung was in the ascendant. Brill was adrift both from the old-world shtetl society and the culture of modern urban Europe. He needed a job; he wanted acceptance and prestige. Like many of his fellow immigrants he favored pragmatic considerations strongly over philosophical ones; his aim was to establish himself and eventually his children, just as Freud's father had tried to do -- and many of our own fathers, too. Latin and Greek -- the Viennese definition of Bildung in general -- meant nothing here, but there was a New York version, and Brill went for it.

If Freud was frustrated by his exclusion from the academic community, at least he had the social and cultural credentials he needed to realize many of his other ambitions. Brill at first did not. In fact he hardly had any credentials at all. He looked to acquire them through affiliation, to find something that might serve, as a gymnasium education did in Vienna, to buttress him, to ground him, to give him roots and a sense of belonging and worth. Like Freud, but later, he found it in education. He managed to put himself through high school and college, and to fight his way into a top-ranked medical school. By the time he was twenty-nine he had graduated from the Columbia University College of Physician and Surgeons and trained in psychiatry and neurology. Eager to build his new career, in 1907 he traveled to Europe -- first to Paris, then to Zurich and Vienna in search of the latest in psychiatry. On that trip he became fascinated by the work of Sigmund Freud. According to Paula Fass, he was looking for a new religion and found it as a convert to psychoanalysis. He came back to New York to marry a non-Jewish wife and begin the first private practice of psychoanalysis in the United States. In 1911 he organized a group of twenty physician colleagues to found the first American psychoanalytic organization, the New York Psychoanalytic Society. He strove (unsuccessfully) to lose his accent, and as his prominence increased, he sought to become part of New York society. He joined the Harmonie Club and the Ethical Culture Society, described by Cuddihy as a neutral place "where socially and culturally aspiring Jews, for whom reform Judaism had become an impossible option, could meet socially with their Christian counterparts." Once established as a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, he worked tirelessly to find an institutional home for psychoanalysis in the profession that had made a home for him; in 1934 a Section on Psychoanalysis was established in the American Psychiatric Association, with Brill as its first head. What Freud had found at the

Sperl Gymnasium, Brill found in medicine.

The 1920s controversy between the two men over lay analysis, therefore, was the reflection, among other things, of differing social conditions in two cities thousands of miles apart. It could be argued that Brill projected his own need for status and belonging onto psychoanalysis in his fierce battle to establish it as a medical specialty, while Freud, a more confident outsider, maintained in the institutional structure of his creation the gymnasium-like structure and ideals that assured his own status and prestige. As Freud did, Brill sought firm establishment for the new science to which he was devoted, but he believed that its best chance for survival was as a branch of psychiatry -- medicine equaled power and security to Brill. He may well have been right in his appraisal; in this country, practical skill was valued as nowhere else, and doctors were the holders of great status, prestige, and wealth.

It is worth noting here that Brill was not alone in his belief that medicine was the place for psychoanalysis. James Jackson Putnam independently decided to limit his own American Psychoanalytic Association to physicians. Putnam, whom Freud valued for his elegant New England roots, had at least as much social and cultural clout that Freud had, yet he too felt that psychoanalysis and medicine were natural partners. There was something in the air over here; pragmatism ruled the roost, and the puritan tradition had always looked a bit askance on "culture" as a distraction from work. I would argue that the concurrence between two such different men as Brill and Putnam on a subject of such passionate importance to Freud reflects the power of that something--a different atmosphere, an idea that practical professional skills make a real man, not indulgence in the soft pleasures of the contemplative intellect. A difference in ideals, a difference in Bildung.

In any case, something was surely different here. I would argue that Brill's willingness to disagree with Freud on a subject of such passionate importance to Freud himself reflects the power of that something--a different atmosphere, an idea that it was practical professional skills that made a real man, not indulgence in the softer pleasures of the contemplative intellect -- a different ideal of Bildung.

That same divide over pragmatism shows up in another byway of psychoanalytic history. Brill credited his own translations of Freud as the single most important factor in the establishment of psychoanalysis in the United States, and in the Fleckian tradition he may well have been right. Before World War I, English versions of all of Freud's books were available in this country, and all but five unimportant ones were the work of Brill. (Riviere's translations did not appear until 1930.) By no means was he the great belles-lettrist that Freud was, which upset Ernest Jones, but Freud in a well-known assertion said that he didn't care: "I would rather have a good friend than a good translator."

John Chynoweth Burnham, however, an American historian and the author of *Psychoanalysis and American Medicine, 1894-1918: Medicine, Science and Culture*, maintains that Brill's translations of Freud made Freud look more simple than he was, more practical -- some would say more American. In this too Brill may have perceived correctly that the emphasis away from its humanistic and contemplative European roots was the best defense for psychoanalysis in a hurried and increasingly technological society.

I think that these brief histories demonstrate how psychoanalysis -- its theory, its practice, and its institutions -- has been influenced by extra-intellectual, or even extra-biographical,

considerations. There is always a sociopolitical dimension in scientific discourse, including ours. Behind conflicting ideologies often lie conflicting ideals, and these must be elucidated if the conflict is ever to be understood. Let me elucidate the ones I've been talking about here:

1) Bildung was not only a description or an experience, but an ideal. 2) the ideal of Bildung in Vienna was transmitted through the institution of the gymnasium, which conferred great rewards of social prestige. 3) In this country, however, the idealization of practical professional skills had replaced the older European ideal of contemplation and appreciation. 3) Freud's own training in the classics deeply informed his own conception of psychoanalysis and his defense of lay analysis, and 4) the thought collective of the early Viennese psychoanalysts was also strongly shaped by the classical ideal of culture that was integral to their society and in whose atmosphere they had grown up. 5) In American society, however, it was professional skill and credentials that were the markers of prestige, not more abstract ideals of "learning." 6) The importance that Brill attached to his medical training informed his conception of psychoanalysis and his rejection of lay analysis, and 7) the structure of the New York Psychoanalytic Society reflected his devotion to the extremely prestigious American medical establishment through which he found his own success and his own acceptance into cultured society. 8) When APsA's effort to affiliate with the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology failed, the Association was reorganized itself following the structures and procedures of the medical board model.

This tale of two men, this double Bildungsroman, as fascinating -- and I think educational -- as it is, is also a cautionary tale. The prestige that our society continues to accord to science must not seduce us back into the assumption that science is value-free, that the choices we make for our own science are purely objective. Science, as well as scientists, has a social history. So does the schooling that contributes to the Bildung of individual scientists, to the thought collectives that they eventually develop, and to the thought styles that become characteristic of them. Freud's use of the Oedipus myth to organize psychological experience is a vivid example of how psychoanalysis reflects one man's classical education. In this context Burnham's comments on Brill's translation of Freud are especially provocative. We are watching for the first time in generations the development of a new translation of Freud's works under the general editorship of Adam Phillips, who does not himself know German. He is giving us a post-modern Freud, rendered by different translators, arranged in an unfamiliar order, and introduced not by analysts but by literary scholars. In the controversy and anticipation over this huge event it is possible to observe first-hand how the choice of a translation is influenced by the thought style of the choosing group, and how the chosen translation then contributes to the further development of the groups it serves.

On a larger scale too the social history of psychoanalysis reflects both the reflective ideal of Bildung that informed the well-established and relatively homogeneous urban culture of central Europe, and the new, outward-looking ideal of technological accomplishment common to the wild hodgepodge of immigrants trying to establish themselves here. While differences in upbringing and ideals like the ones that drove Freud and Brill in such different directions startled the Viennese Sterba and Waelder sixty years ago, they are a commonplace among Americans today. What we have in common is precisely what divides us -- most of us are the children or grandchildren of immigrants. We are products not only of the reflective ideal of Bildung that informed psychoanalysis from its inception, but also of the newer, outward-looking ideal of technological accomplishment characteristic of this country at the turn of the last century and of the immigrants from many lands who were trying to establish themselves here. No near-

universal acceptance of any ideal of Bildung is likely in this huge and unwieldy melting pot of a nation. In psychoanalysis, for instance, as in society, that old choice between "learning" and "skill" is still with us. As we struggle with the growing recognition that science and knowledge cannot be absolute, some of us look to science and scientific technology more firmly than ever and invest in them great hope for the future; some of us fear uncontrolled technology and hope that return to a humanistic tradition will counterbalance its dangers. Such differences strongly influence our attitudes towards psychoanalytic research, and our desires to be better integrated (or not) into the intellectual community at large. There is no way that psychoanalytic ideals can be distinguished from ideals of Bildung, or that our different ideals will not organize us into different communities and styles; but to the extent that we can understand and explore these ideals, we may find that our thought communities can converse more effectively with each other. This is greatly to be desired.

Over the decades our Association has suffered from the isolation imposed by its single-minded preoccupation with the importance of a medical degree. Whatever sovereignty a thought collective may claim for its own ideas, these claims must be tested, and if necessary contested. The more easily competing ideas can be dismissed -- or worse, ignored -- the more likely it is that no such proving will occur, and ideas that are never tried become rigid and ossified. We can't remain like the Cabots of Boston, who spoke only to God. We cannot continue to speak only to ourselves and the steadily fewer mental health professionals who are willing to listen in on our soliloquies. The health of a science depends on free communication within the field, and its place in a community mandates that its work be accessible outside the field as well. That is why Fleck felt so strongly that the major challenge for thought collectives was to maintain communication with other ones despite disparate thought styles.

This is a challenge which psychoanalysis has often failed to meet. But now a new opportunity of fabulous potential has arisen, one that can help us water dry old roots and bring them back to life. The computer is now a major medium of psychoanalytic publication, and it has a power that no medium before it has ever had to heal old wounds. I don't want to romanticize the machine or to glorify technology per se as the answer to all our troubles, but to concentrate on one very practical fact (I'm an American, too): Bildung is not a problem for search engines.

The PEP CD-ROM. In 1992 Paul Mosher first proposed the creation of a CD-ROM containing the complete text, since their inception, of the main English-language psychoanalytic journals, a breathtaking conception at that time. Mosher's proposal led directly to APsaA's first organizational effort to produce such a disc under the leadership of Vann Spruiell. A second attempt, after that initial attempt faltered, led to an agreement -- during Judy Schachter's Presidency -- on a collaborative effort between the APsaA and the London Institutes of Psychoanalysis under the auspices of Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing (PEP), a new joint U.S.-British corporation with Paul Mosher, Nadine Levinson, and Judy Schachter as the U.S. Directors. The result, the PEP CD-ROM, has transformed the psychoanalytic ecology. This transformation was not foreseen, however, when the project was first broached. The full text database was seen merely as a successor to Jourlit, our first computerized database, which is really a simple searchable bibliography. Following the Jourlit template, only five journals were slated for inclusion in the CD-ROM: JAPA, the IJP, the International Review, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, and the Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, a selection which carried forward the "traditional" APsaA thought style and that of the mainstream in Great Britain: ego psychology, object relations, and Kleinian psychoanalysis. But after some hard lobbying, APsaA and London

agreed to include Contemporary Psychoanalysis, and the rest is history. Contemporary Psychoanalysis is the organ of a thought collective (the William Alanson White), and a thought style (interpersonal psychoanalysis), that felt very alien to the many APsaA psychoanalysts who were familiar almost exclusively with the thought style that the American had inherited from Brill's NYPI. With the inclusion of "Contemporary" on the CD-ROM, for the very first time estranged American psychoanalytic thought collectives were symmetrically available to each other without barriers; for the first time analysts had an absolutely risk-free -- even affect-free, if they wanted it -- venue in which they could comfortably begin to familiarize themselves with each other's work. This broadening of the content of the PEP database has continued at an accelerating pace, with the full text of 13 journals and 20 books in the latest edition. Search engines make no distinctions among thought collectives either, or academic degrees, or "schools" of thought. The minute that Contemporary Psychoanalysis was embraced by the CD-ROM database, the transmission issues between two thought collectives were in large measure equalized. The WAW community could now be recognized as an equal partner, an indissoluble part of the bedrock of American psychoanalytic knowledge, as accessible as our traditional literature to any scholar investigating psychoanalytic thought. Distinctions that we used to make are barely apparent to outsiders searching our literature, and the more use we make of computerized search technology, the less apparent they become to us. How many of us now do psychological double-takes when a PEP literature search brings up an article from Psychoanalytic Dialogues or Psychoanalytic Psychology? We in APsaA, and the members of the Psychoanalytic Institute in London, can congratulate ourselves on at this farsighted contribution to the creation and transmission of psychoanalytic knowledge.

We are deeply engaged in struggles over boundaries. The PEP CD-ROM resolved one set, but plenty remain. Will we let new ideas in, and will the new people who think them be welcome among us too? Will we seek to join other ranks ourselves, to integrate ourselves into the larger society of academe? If so, how will we deal with the demands that that larger society will make upon us to test and prove our theories? We can't foresee the future any better than Freud or Brill. But unless we want our once thriving community to become a ghost town, we have to try.

For more than a century, even in times of so-called theoretical "pluralism," many of us have clung to an essentialist, authoritarian, context-independent approach to psychoanalytic knowledge, even as we have increasingly come to challenge that approach in the analytic situation itself. For a long time an absolutist stance served us well. It gave us the authority to establish a core psychoanalytic identity and a transmittable, teachable, psychoanalytic practice. Yes, it cost us something -- mostly the loss of the great talents that we systematically excluded from our ranks. But we were not alone in it; it reflected the world view of educated people in general, and it did not in any way isolate psychoanalysis from other fields of intellectual, philosophical, or scientific inquiry. We are far more alone in it now, and we are beginning to see that isolation is no longer adaptive. Our ideas are no longer common among scientists, social scientists, and humanists -- the intellectual world in which psychoanalysis exists and upon which it is dependent for its continued existence as a profession and a psychotherapy. Our absolutism, and our insistence in playing by ourselves and by our own rules, have not earned us the respect of that world, and although we are looking hard in our theory at the impact of authoritarianism in the consulting room, we have not yet turned the same scrutiny upon our behavior as a scientific organization.

Psychoanalysis is paying a very high price for the power to make its own rules. Our past choices

may have been necessary, but now they are securing for us not independence, but isolation. Unless we want to be relegated to the borders of intellectual life, we need to learn the language of our neighboring disciplines. We need to be able to talk with our neighbors. We need to learn to participate in progress (even when we don't agree about what constitutes progress) without fragmentation or solipsism, to avoid the twin pitfalls of losing everything in the defense of authoritarian hegemonies and throwing the baby out with the bath water.

As in clinical work, so in institutional life. The challenge we face today is how to re-imagine these, and ourselves, at a time when we can no longer be certain about how good psychoanalysis, and good psychoanalysts, should be judged -- or by whom. We cannot function without the boundaries that differentiate our game from all others, but neither can we pretend that they are absolute, or that we are invulnerable within them. The subject of boundaries pervades these very meetings. Who do we allow in and who do we keep out? Who is allowed to teach? Who gets to make the rules? No one denies that some lines must be drawn, but to draw them justly, constructively, and with foresight is no easy matter. Do we want our institutional structure to be rigid and uncompromising, a corporate version of what Reich called character armor? Or should it be flexible, a porous membrane that distinguishes us from the outside world but allows us to communicate with it? Do we want our "textbook science," as Fleck called it, to be a "classical" and inclusive one, a narrow orthodoxy, a practical skill? Will we allow ourselves to be scrutinized, as we scrutinize others -- to let, as sociologist Helga Nowotny has put it, the public into the kitchen, instead of insisting on invisibility except when we are all dressed up in our Sunday best? And if not do we really want to exclude ourselves from the scientific, psychological, and philosophical investigations that bear so nearly on our own field? To answer questions like that depends in part on our ideas about what matters in the outside world, and that brings us back to the matter of *Bildung*.

Once upon a time, at the beginning of the twentieth century in Vienna, Freud made a decision to keep psychoanalysis away from psychiatry and to isolate it from the university setting from which he himself had been excluded. In his tough-minded and independent way, and in order to retain control of his creation, Freud cast the die that separated psychoanalysis from the rest of the academic world.

Once upon a time, at the beginning of the twentieth century in New York, Brill made a decision to link psychoanalysis to psychiatry, to attach it to a prestigious profession in order, he hoped, to secure its survival and to secure his own access to it. In his tough-minded and independent way cast the die that made psychoanalysis and medicine bedfellows, making it accessible to some at the same time that he effectively closed it off to others. The so-called "free" professions or *freie Berufe* like medicine and law, unlike the pure "academic" disciplines (*akademische Berufe*), had room for practice and success outside the confines of the university -- that is, for Jews and other "outsiders." For Freud this was not good enough; he wanted institutional status for his creation, and if the university wouldn't have him, he would establish an institution of his own. For Brill, the *freie Berufe* were the haven that he, and many like him, needed to establish both psychoanalysis and themselves. Sociology is transmitted through people.

Drawing lines is never easy, and the consequences may be unexpected, important, and enduring. The legacies of both of those decisions lives on. Psychoanalysis is still too distant from its academic kin, and in this country Brill's quasi-medical administrative and educational structure remains, in spite of the changes in our population. As we go on to draw new lines, we must

appreciate that they are not ordained by fate or by some absolute requirement of our "science," but are the result, consciously and not, of the complex and interwoven forces among which we all live -- we choose how and where we draw them. We need to be more aware of why.

Analysts teach their patients that greater awareness makes for better choices. As a clinical discipline, we have become aware of the context-dependence of knowledge and the costs of authoritarianism. But this must not distract our attention from the need to make our theory scientifically testable. And we must go down that same road as an institution as well as a science, integrating American psychoanalysis into the wider fellowship of the intellect that encompasses the clinic, the university -- and the laboratory, all three. We have to make decisions whose consequences we cannot entirely foresee. As Freud's and Brill's decisions were dictated by their ideals, so will ours be. We are now on our own Bildungsreise, our own developmental journey. To move out of our old traditions of isolation and exclusion we must make those choices with our eyes wide open.

To bring this all together, I turn back to Fleck. He believed that in order to maintain cohesiveness in its community, a thought collective may downplay differences among its own sub-thought collectives: the medical and the humanistic, for instance, or the biological and the psychological. The one-person and the two-person divisions. And the administrative styles that are increasingly functioning as separate cultures within our organization -- the Board of Professional Standards culture and the Board of Directors culture. Fleck also made the related observation that thought collectives tend to exaggerate the differences between themselves and other (alien) thought collectives, which again tends to maintain internal cohesiveness.

It is always difficult to move from the abstract to the concrete, but based on this view I offer two propositions. We need to acknowledge and examine the different thought styles within our own collective (the medical, the humanistic, the research-oriented) and learn to recognize the effects, both artificially divisive and artificially cohesive, of Fleck's trends on our own organizational style and structures. We also need to make an effort to lower the barriers between ourselves and alien outside collectives so as to determine what real differences there may be between us, and also what real connections may exist. Only thus can we consider intelligently how much collaboration is possible and desirable. The recent decision to invite a member of the WAW to observe the BOPS is a small pragmatic step in that direction and one of considerable historic significance, related to the decision made several years ago to include the WAW journal *Contemporary Psychoanalysis* in the PEP CD-ROM, a decision of both functional and historic significance.

Sterba, a gebildete Mensch himself, once addressed himself to the problem of boundaries. He compared the role of the analyst with that of Virgil in the *Divine Comedy*. As Virgil leads Dante through the *Inferno*, writes Sterba, "so the analyst guides his or her patient through the 'netherworld' of the unconscious, "continuously accompanying, comforting, fortifying, explaining, and encouraging." Some might disagree with Sterba's one-person view of the analytic interaction. But as Fleck makes clear, we can disagree with each other without excluding each other, we can disagree and still talk. Sterba reminds us rightly of the words of the angel guarding the gate of Purgatory -- an unpleasant but necessary and temporary stop on another Bildungsreise: "It is better to err in opening than in keeping shut" (Dante 1973).

REFERENCES

- Burnham, J.C. (1967). Psychoanalysis and American medicine 1894-1918: Medicine, science and culture. *Psychological Issues* 5(4):1-249.
- Cuddihy, J. (1974). *The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss, and the Struggle with Jewish Modernity*. NY: Basic Books.
- Dante A. (1973). *The Divine Comedy: Purgatorio*, Trans C.S Singleton. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fass, P. S. (1968) A. A. Brill - Pioneer and Prophet. Masters Thesis, Columbia University
- Fleck, L. (1927). Some specific features of the medical way of thinking. In R. S. Cohen and T. Schnelle, eds., *Cognition and Fact*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985, pp. 39-46.
- CCC (1935). *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact*. Ed. T. J. Trenn and R. K. Merton. Trans. F. Bradley and T. J. Trenn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970
- Freud, S. (1933). *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. Standard Edition 22:5-182.
- CCC (1923). Two Encyclopedia Articles. Standard Edition 18:235-59.
- Grinwald, M. (1941). *Haaretz*. September 21st, 1941.
- Hale, N.G. (1995). *Freud and the Americans: The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis in the United States, 1876-1917*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kuhn, T. (1962). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lewontin, R. (2004). Dishonesty in Science. *New York Review of Books* November 18th, 2004.
- Novatny, H.
- Pyles, R. (2003). The good fight: psychoanalysis in the age of managed care. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 51(suppl.): 23B41.
- Sterba, R. (1982). *Reminiscences of a Vienna Psychoanalyst*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Winter, S. (1999). *Freud and the Institution of Psychoanalytic Knowledge*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Wang, W. (2003). Bildung or the Formation of the Psychoanalyst. *Psychoanalysis and History* 5:91-118.
- Wyatt.F. (1988). The severance of psychoanalysis from its cultural matrix. In *Freud in Exile: Psychoanalysis and its Vicissitudes*, ed. E. Timms and N. Segal. New Haven: Yale University Press, PP 145-55.